This paper tests whether the transition from the old Economic Competition Act, which was based on the so-called "abuse system", to the new Competition Act, which was based on "prohibition system", in the Netherlands had an impact on the price-cost margins in manufacturing industries during the period 1993-2007. The paper further investigates if the price-cost margins were higher in industries where temporary antitrust immunity was granted for subset of firms that engaged in concerted practices. The results indicate that the change in the competition law in the Netherlands had a very small and negative, yet statistically insignificant deterrent effect on the price-cost margins. Elsewhere, markups were higher in industries in which temporary antitrust immunity was granted for some class of coordinated actions.
Introduction
There is increasing curiosity among competition authorities with regard to the economic effects of competition policy and the effectiveness of enforcing the competition law.
Policymakers are keen on quantifying the impact of antitrust policies. A great majority of competition authorities focus on the effects of competition policy on consumer surplus, since protecting consumers and maximizing consumer surplus is reckoned as a mission statement by many competition authorities. Yet, there is another dimension of competition policy enforcement, which is on producer surplus. Increased competition decreases monopoly power and reduces price-cost margins (controlling for other relevant factors).
This curiosity among policymakers is even more intense in the Netherlands, since there have been dramatic changes during the last twenty years. The old Economic Competition Act of 1956 (WEM: Wet Economische Mededinging), which was based on the so-called "abuse system", was replaced by the new Competition Act (Mededingingswet), which was based on "prohibition system". Concurrently, the new enforcement agency, the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa) was established in 1998. Furthermore, the new Competition Act allowed undertakings to apply for dispensation for agreements that were already in existence and that had begun under the former Act. More specifically, firms were allowed to request exemption for agreements, decisions or conduct that improved production/distribution or stimulated economic or technical progress, and, if a reasonable portion of the benefits accrued to consumers. In this study we investigate the impact of the change in the competition policy enforcement in the Netherlands and the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity mentioned above on the level of industry price-cost margins for manufacturing industries. We hypothesize that a tougher competition policy reduces the ability of firms in any market to collude and, consequently, the price-cost margins will be lower, whilst controlling for other factors that are believed to affect the price-cost margins. We also hypothesize that in industries where concerted practices are immune from antitrust law, the price-cost margins will be higher, everything else being equal. In order to test these hypotheses, we employ a two-step dynamic panel data estimation technique developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) , Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) , and Blundell and Bond (1998) . Our estimation results suggest that the change in the competition law in the Netherlands had a very small and negative, yet statistically insignificant deterrent effect on the price-cost margins. As to the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity in the aftermath of the institutional change, we found that markups were higher in industries in which temporary antitrust immunity was granted for some class of coordinated actions.
The plan of the study is as follows: Section 2 presents a review of prior empirical research on deterrent effects of antitrust policy enforcement and on economic impact of granting antitrust immunity. Section 3 explains the institutional background for competition policy in the Netherlands. Section 4 provides the details of data employed in this study and elaborates on the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally Section 6 discusses the empirical findings and concludes.
Review of the Relevant Literature

Deterrent Effects of Antitrust Policy Enforcement
The empirical studies examining the deterrent effects of antitrust policy enforcement can be grouped into two categories: studies at micro-level in which data arises from prosecution and studies at macro-level in which a broader section of overall economic activity is analyzed.
Beginning from micro-level studies, in their analysis of the market for white pan bread, Block et al. (1981) reveal that raising Department of Justice's (DOJ) enforcement capacity or indicting a DOJ price-fixing complaint had the deterrent effect of decreasing markups in the industry. Block and Feinstein (1986) collect data on about 1000 highway contracts in the U.S.
over the period from January 1975 to May 1982. Their findings of the empirical analysis suggest that increases in the level of sanctions for bid rigging had a deterrent effect in the U.S.
highway construction industry. Elsewhere, Sproul (1993) used data from a survey of 25 pricefixing cases filed by the DOJ to firms operating in various industries between 1973 and 1984.
Surprisingly, a filing for price fixing results in slightly higher prices. More specifically, prices
increase by approximately 7 percent over the four years after indictment. The author ascribes this result to either that DOJ prosecuted cost-reducing cartels or the penalties were not deterrent enough. Besides, he also found out that the severity of penalties was negatively associated with price.
On the other hand, studies at macro-level focused on impact of change in antitrust policy on markups in a broader section of overall economic activity. These changes in antitrust policy have mostly been in the form of tightening competition law or following a stricter antitrust
policy. An example is Konings et al. (2001) , where the authors investigate if the changes in the competition law and policy have an impact on the level and the dynamics of firm price cost margins in Belgium. Using a firm level panel dataset from 1992 to 1996, they reveal that competition policy in Belgium did not have an impact on price-cost margins. The authors attribute this finding to that the old price regulatory system had already disciplined Belgian firms considerably. Elsewhere, Warzynski (2001) tested whether price cost margins were lower when antitrust policy was implemented strictly relatively to the period when antitrust policy was lenient thanks to the influence of the Chicago School. In his analysis of the data for 450 American manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1994, he reveals that markups were lower when the antitrust policy was very tough 1 .
Taking all these into account, we would conclude that the empirical evidence on the deterrent effects of antitrust policy enforcement is mixed. This is fundamentally owing to the idiosyncrasy of the institutions, antitrust policy design and data in each study mentioned above.
Economic Impact of Granting Antitrust Immunity
Firms have incessantly been searching for ways to bypass the constraints that are imposed by the antitrust laws that shape economic environment. One possible way of circumventing the competition laws is having antitrust immunity via exemption applications. Antitrust authorities have been flooded with many antitrust immunity applications involving efficiency or ruinous competition arguments as long as the laws enabled them to grant exemptions. Bilotkach (2007) report that airline alliances with antitrust immunity offer lower fares. On the other hand, in his analysis of the effect of an agreement in which two airline companies were allowed to coordinate on capacity and sales targets, Kamita (2010) finds that the airline companies not only raised fairs under antitrust immunity but also retained supracompetitive profits after the immunity expired. Bilotkach and Huschelrath (2011) discuss also that antitrust immunity might have some effects on non-price characteristics of airline markets except for the effects on prices. They argue that antitrust immunity can constrain individual partner airlines' network development, facilitate collusion, and lead to the foreclosure of the interline markets to airlines from competing alliances. Elsewhere, in his analysis of Webb-Pomerene export cartels that were exempted from the antitrust laws, Dick (1992) reports that these cartels were successful in raising prices in only three commodity industries. Interestingly, Clyde and Reitzes (1995) , in their study of the U.S. international ocean shipping industry that enjoyed antitrust immunity and a conference system that permitted carriers to enter into pricing agreements, could not find a significant relationship between conference share and freight rates. Overall, the general conclusion to be drawn from these empirical studies is that the effects of antitrust immunity on market prices are indeterminate, as pointed out in Bilotkach and Huschelrath (2011) .
The Enforcement of Dutch Competition Policy during the Last
Two Decades
Netherlands' competition policy has changed drastically over the past twenty years. -Brusse and Griffiths, 1998, p. 24) . As to the scale of these agreements, 77 % of them were at national level, while the remaining 23 % were operating locally. Dramatically, the majority of these agreements consisted of multiple provisions, as can be seen from Table   I .
In 1992, the MEA (1992) announced further details on the 201 market sharing agreements that were being kept in the register in September 1991. These agreements were relatively younger compared to the previously mentioned horizontal price agreements. Only 14 per cent had been in the register for more than two decades and another 17 per cent had been kept on the records for more than ten years (Asbeek-Brusse and Griffiths, 1998, p. 25). More interestingly, even within the general description of "market sharing", 94 % of these agreements involved other forms of restrictive practices.
The renown of the Netherlands as cartel paradise had also been confirmed internationally, Having argued that the Netherlands was indeed a cartel paradise under the former Economic
Competition Act, we can discuss more detailed explanations for the failure of the prosecution of anti-competitive practices. Actually, most of the explanation lies within the nature of the legislation itself. To begin with, the old Economic Competition Act postulated that cartels are not harmful, unless the government showed the contrary, which left the burden of proof to the government. Second, the term "general interest", a concept deficient in context or guidance for decisions, was not specified within the Act, which entrusted the MEA a large margin of judgment. Finally, despite the fact that there was a cartel register, the Act did not law down provisions for detecting unregistered restrictive agreements or for sanctions against non-registration. Accordingly, the agreements recorded under the register represented an incomplete depiction of cartels.
In brief, the competition policy under the former Economic Competition Act was completely reactive. Since other aspects of the general interest contained macro-economic policy objectives in the form of price controls, or its industrialization and regional policies, or industrial subsidies supporting sectors during the first oil crisis, antitrust policy could not find much space to itself. Moreover, as indicated by Asbeek-Brusse and Griffiths (1998), the conflicts were resolved within the deliberations between business representatives and governmental officials. More often than not, officials at the MEA worked concomitantly with business representatives. This intimacy brought about a gentle stance towards collusive business behavior.
Having understood that the local legislative climate posed little threat to coordinated business behavior, one might ask the question of whether exposure to trade in the Dutch economy had a disciplining effect on concerted practices. However, the fact that three-fourths of Dutch consumers' purchases were domestic proves this statement to be wrong. More specifically, industries such as construction, utilities, financial transactions, transport, retail trade, and consumer and professional services, which cover a great majority of the economic activities, were isolated from imports (OECD, 1998, p. 7).
Given the lax enforcement of the domestic competition law, one might also consider the involvement of European Commission (EC) and the European Competition Law as a second potential threat to collusive business behavior in the Netherlands. Actually, the fact that the Dutch were among the last to have legislation that did not prohibit coordinated actions utterly meant that Dutch cartels were under close inspection by the EC to a greater extent. The initial effect of the EC competition law was on the behavior of firms instead of the enforcement of the domestic competition law. For example, while there were 125 recorded collective exclusive dealing agreements in 1963, there were only 45 agreements registered in 1978 (Mok, 1978, p. 743-744 (Drahos, 2001, p. 213) .
The initial reaction of the Dutch government was to invigorate the anti-cartel policy within the existing framework. Except for a more active policy of dealing with cartel complaints, this included a sequence of general prohibitions on horizontal price agreements (effective from
July 1993) and, on market sharing agreements and collusive tendering agreements (effective from June 1994). Yet, owing to the inapplicability of these early prohibitions due to the nature of the former "abuse system"; a new Competition Act (Mededingingswet), which was based on "prohibition system", was introduced in 1998, accompanied by the establishment of the new enforcement agency (NMa).
Article 6 of the new Competition Act complies with Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 81 TEC and ex Article 85 EEC Treaty) in its forbiddance of all types of anti-competitive agreements.
As to exemptions, the Dutch competition law subsumes all of the EU block exemptions for general types of agreements, exemptions for specific sectors, and exemptions for specific agreements. 6 This incorporation is dynamic in the sense that the Dutch law incorporates not only those exemptions already endorsed but also those that will be endorsed in the future. Elsewhere, the new Competition Act enabled undertakings to apply for dispensation for agreements that were already in existence and that had begun in the pro-cartel period. More specifically, undertakings were allowed to request exemption from Article 6 Mw via Article the number of firms involved, the duration of agreements, the total sales of all firms involved in cooperative agreement etc. The reaction was that the NMa was swarmed with dispensation requests -1,100 at the deadline. The evaluation of these exemption requests by the NMa literally took years (until 2004) . Based on assessments, the NMa (i) declined the request, as the agreement was not anti-competitive, or (ii) exemption was granted for some other requests, even though the agreements were anti-competitive by nature, or (iii) dispensation was granted after altering or reformulating the initial agreements by the firms involved, or (iv) reached the decision that the Competition Act is not applicable. Referring to the NMa's verdicts on dispensation applications, of these dispensation requests, 47 % did not violate any of the new competition rules, whereas of the other 53 %, only 9 % were granted as exemptions by the NMa.
There were a couple of different motives of parties to seek dispensation. For some of them, the main motivation was legal certainty. Firms wanted to abstain from the ambiguity about competition issues, as there had been substantial changes in the competition law and its enforcement, which left most of the companies hesitant about their agreements with other undertakings. In spite of the fact that general prohibitions on horizontal price agreements and, on market sharing agreements and collusive tendering agreements became effective as of July 1993, and of June 1994, respectively; there were not many prosecutions during the period between the early prohibitions and the change in the competition law (between 1993 and 1998) . On the other hand, the motivation for undertakings with anti-competitive agreements was different. At the time of the change in the law, there were some "cartels" with huge amounts of investments experiencing overcapacity problems. The members of those "cartels"
wanted to divide overcapacity, and, in search of legal protection, they sought antitrust immunity for their agreements 8 .
Herein might someone doubt that hardcore cartels were not contained in the subsample of the dispensations requests with anti-competitive agreements. "Dirty" cartels should not be expected to be on the original list in the first place, so to speak, since one cannot expect cartels to be reported in 1998, as they had already been declared illegal in 1994. This notion is partially true, as there were very few price-fixing cases in these exemption requests.
Nonetheless, the remaining dispensation requests with anti-competitive agreements contain market sharing agreements, bid rigging agreements (which has always been a problem in the Netherlands, and not been seen as restrictive), joint production agencies (e.g. asphalt production) etc, which were evident breaches of the competition law. Indeed, these were typical Dutch cartels operating at national or local level. Furthermore, one should note that even though there were general prohibitions under the former Economic Competition act, these provisions were laxly applicable and the enforcement was very weak in the sense that there were very few prosecutions during the period of 1993-1998.
The Data and Empirical Specifications
Data Sources
We use several two different sources of data. These are Dispensation Requests Database and Production Survey (PS). Below, we briefly describe these main sources of data.
Dispensation Requests Database
This database includes original dispensation requests from the NMa achieves. The database is confidential and is not publicly available to researchers. It contains the names of undertakings with an agreement, the code of the industry in which undertakings were operating at the time of application (SBI 9 codes), the number of parties in an agreement, the total annual revenues of the companies involved in an agreement, and the duration of agreement. In total, there are approximately 1,100 dispensation applications. The median number of parties in these applications is 50. Besides, the average duration of the agreements for which exemption was sought is 6.5 years with a standard deviation of 8.7 years. For the minority of the dispensation applications for which the competition law applied, immunity was granted.
To be more specific, 37 concerted practices in various industries were exempted from the competition law. There is not a clear pattern for these industries with antitrust immunity. As to the duration of the antitrust immunity, the average time period during which these multilateral restrictive practices were exempted from the competition law was 5.39 years. 
PS
Empirical Strategy and Variables
In the current study, we try to measure if tougher competition policy enforcement had deterrent effects by regressing industry price-cost margins on a dummy indicating the change in the competition law in the Netherlands and a set of control variables. Concurrently, we also investigate if the price-cost margins have been higher in those industries where temporary antitrust agreement has been conferred for some class of concerted practices. The following specification is employed to test the impact of the change in the competition law in the Netherlands: [1]
Besides, we also estimate the following model to investigate the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity on price-cost margins in industry after the change in the competition law:
+ 5 ℎ + 6 ℎℎ + + 
Time Dummies
TIME = year fixed effects
In the current study, price-cost margins are calculated at industry level as a share of gross profits to total sales. Gross profits are obtained by subtracting total wages and the costs of intermediate inputs from value added. The lagged price-cost margins are included as a regressor to control for the fact that some industries may have been colluding secretly or tacitly prior to time t, a fact that might otherwise obfuscate the relationship between the introduction of the Competition Act and industry price-cost margins. As one might remember, the new Competition Act allowed undertakings to apply for dispensation for agreements that were already in existence and that had begun in the era of "cartel paradise". More specifically, firms had been allowed to request exemption from Article 6 Mw that prohibited restrictive concerted practices. The variable immunity controls for those industries in which some subset of firms received exemption from Article 6 Mw. Furthermore, in order to control for exposure to trade we have included import and export intensities. Besides, as crude proxies for increase in market demand, change in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (dgdp) and percentage growth of sales in the relevant market (growth) are also included. On the other hand, in order to control for market structure we include Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (hhi), which is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares based on sales. By construction, the higher values of this variable indicate more concentrated market structures. Adopting a static and traditional view, one would expect that price-cost margins in concentrated industries will be higher, as firms are enjoying higher levels of profits owing to less number of competitors. In addition to control variables described above, we include interaction term between change in the competition law (law) and concentration measure (hhi), to check if the impact of concentration on price-cost margins were aggravated under the new system. The underlying thought is that once a stricter antitrust policy was enforced, firms might have preferred mergers or takeovers as possible strategies rather than engaging in illegal and dirty coordinated actions. Finally, we consider the time-specific effects as fixed and include time dummies in the analysis. Arellano and Bond (1991) , Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) . We first consider Arellano-Bond estimation, also known as "difference GMM", which uses lagged independent variables as instruments after the equation has been differenced to eliminate unobserved fixed effects.
Secondly, we implement the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation, also known as "system GMM", which is built on a system of two equations (the equation with levels and the transformed equation). A common feature of these estimators is that they require no autocorrelation in the errors. Having performed the estimations, we will run some specification tests to verify the absence of autocorrelation. Besides, in order to ensure moreefficient estimation we will use optimal or two-step GMM in both estimation procedures.
However, the problem in this context is that standard errors for the two-step GMM estimator might be downward biased as shown by Arellano and Bond (1991) . Therefore, we will use a bias-corrected robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix for the two-step GMM estimator devised by Windmeijer (2005) .
In order to take into account the endogeneity of growth and hhi, we have used one lag of these variables together with the remaining exogenous regressors as instruments. The employment of instruments for two endogenous variables and one lagged dependent variable will necessitate numerous instruments, which might result in the famous case of "instrument proliferation", as stated in Roodman (2009) . "Instrument proliferation" might lead to overfitting endogenous variables. In this case we fail to take out the endogenous components and bias coefficient estimates. Another problem associated with instrument proliferation is that it might vitiate the Hansen test of instrument validity. However, since there is no formal test and procedure for identifying and solving these problems, researchers have come up with the rule of thumb proposing that the number of instruments should be less than or equal to the number of observational units. Therefore, we try to stick to this rule of thumb in our GMM estimations.
Table II provides summary statistics on industry characteristics during both pre-and postimplementation of the new Competition Act. During the old Economic Competition Act era, price-cost margins appear to be lower, which can also be seen from the evolution of price-cost margins depicted in Figure I . We also present an overview of the changes in the price-cost margins under the old Economic Competition Act and under the New Competition Act in Figure II . Just looking at descriptive measures, one can say that the deterrent impact of the new Competition Act has been heterogeneous across Dutch manufacturing industries. Yet, without effectively controlling for other relevant factors in an econometric setting, we cannot reach sound and scientific conclusions.
The Empirical Results
Tables III and IV report difference and system GMM estimates of various specifications, respectively, for the impact of change in the competition law on the price-cost margins. In all specifications, fixed year dummies are included as well. The reported standard errors have the finite sample correction developed by Windmeijer (2005) to handle the potential finite sample bias of two-step GMM.
We would first like to draw reader's attention to the satisfactory results of specification tests.
The tests concerning serial correlation do not reject the presence of first order, but rejects second order serial correlation. Besides, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the population moment conditions are correct, since the Sargan tests do not reject the validity of over-identifying restrictions in all specifications.
The results show that exposure to trade (import and export), market structure (hhi), and changes in market demand (dgnp and growth) do not have statistically significant effects on the price-cost margins of Dutch manufacturing industries in any specification. The outcome of the imprecise effect of import intensity on industry price-cost margins is also in line with the finding of Konings et al. (2001) , where the authors found that import competition does not lead to lower price-cost margins in the Netherlands. Elsewhere, concentration (hhi) has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on price-cost margins. Furthermore, whether the impact of industry concentration has been higher after the change in the competition law has not been confirmed in the current setting, since the interaction term (lawXhhi) has a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient in the seventh specification.
In both difference and system GMM estimates of all specifications, we find that the coefficient of the lagged price-cost margins (lag_pcm) is highly statistically significant (at 1 % level) indicating that we should reject a static model in favor of a dynamic model. Finally, the variable in which we show our greatest interest, that is, the introduction of the new Competition Act (law) is negatively and insignificantly related to the price-cost margins, which seems not to corroborate our first maintained hypothesis: the transition from the old system to the new system did not bring about statistically significant deterrent effects.
Subsequently, in Tables V and VI we present difference and system GMM estimates of various specifications, respectively, for the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity on the industry price-cost margins. Just as in the former specifications, fixed year dummies are included to control for year fixed effects. Similarly, we present the standard errors with
Windmeijer (2005) correction.
The failure to reject the null hypotheses of both the serial correlation and the Sargan tests provide support for our model. Likewise, the fact that the coefficient of the lagged price-cost margins (lag_pcm) is highly statistically significant (at 1 % level) in both difference and system GMM estimates of all specifications, leads us to be confident about our dynamic specification.
The results demonstrate that exposure to trade (import and export), market structure (hhi), and changes in market demand (dgnp and growth) do not have statistically significant effects on the price-cost margins of Dutch manufacturing industries under the new Competition act in any specification. Importantly, the coefficient on temporary antitrust immunity (immunity) enters positively and statistically significantly to the regression equation in all specifications.
This result verifies our second maintained hypothesis stating that in industries where concerted practices are immune from antitrust law, the price-cost margins will be higher everything else being equal. However, one should bear in mind that concerted practices that were conferred immunity from antitrust law constituted a tiny fraction of all concerted practices for which exemption was sought. Thus, the industries where antitrust immunity was granted for some class of concerted practices form a very tiny share of our whole sample.
Moreover, these concerted practices for which immunity was granted were not necessarily "dirty" agreements the Dutch Competition Authority overlooked. Besides, the selection of industries in which a subset of agreements would be immune from antitrust law might be endogenous with respect to price-cost margins. That is, the NMa might have allowed concerted practices in industries where price-cost margins were already expected to be high.
Taking these caveats into account, we provide a discussion of the empirical findings in the next section.
Discussion and Conclusion
One aspect of estimating the economic impact of competition policy enforcement regards the change in producer surplus. Controlling for other relevant factors, increased competitive pressures via enforcing stricter policies are expected to curb monopoly power and joint dominance of collusive practices. An indirect way of measuring this is to investigate the impact of the change in the competition law that serves as an invaluable natural experiment on price-cost margins. The institutional change in the Netherlands provides a unique example of such natural experiment. The transition from the old Economic Competition Act, which was based on the so-called "abuse system", to the new Competition Act, which was based on "prohibition system" accompanied by the establishment of the new enforcement agency, the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa), was clearly aimed at fostering competition and putting an end to "cartel paradise" era. Following this line of reasoning, we investigated the impact of the change in the competition policy enforcement in the Netherlands on the level of industry price-cost margins for manufacturing industries during the period 1993-2007. We tested our first hypothesis stating that a tougher competition policy reduces the ability of firms in any market to collude and, consequently, the price-cost margins will be lower, whilst controlling for other factors that are believed to affect the price-cost margins.
Furthermore, the possibility of granting temporary antitrust immunity for some class of concerted practices that were shown to have improved production/distribution or stimulated economic or technical progress, and, of which reasonable portion of the benefits accrued to consumers, enables us to assess a rarely touched research question. Our second maintained hypothesis was that in industries where concerted practices are immune from antitrust law, the price-cost margins will be higher everything else being equal. More specifically, we analyzed the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity on industry price-cost margins in the aftermath of the institutional change mentioned above.
In order to test these two hypotheses, we employed a two-step dynamic panel data estimation technique following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) , Arellano and Bond (1991) , Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998 did not lead to any structural change in some others. This explanation is partially consistent with the finding of Creusen et al. (2006) revealing that the level of competition diverged widely in many Dutch industries during the period 1993-2001. In order to tackle this heterogeneity issue, we plan to conduct research on firm-level data in specific industries in our future research.
As to the impact of granting temporary antitrust immunity in the aftermath of the institutional change, we found that markups were higher in industries in which temporary antitrust immunity was granted for some class of coordinated actions. However, one should bear in mind that concerted practices that were conferred immunity from antitrust law constituted a tiny fraction of all concerted practices for which exemption was sought. Furthermore, these concerted practices for which immunity was granted were not necessarily "dirty" agreements the NMa overlooked. Plus, the selection of industries in which a subset of agreements would be immune from antitrust law might be endogenous with respect to price-cost margins. That is, the NMa might have allowed concerted practices in industries where price-cost margins were already expected to be high.
Obviously, the change in the competition law has impact not only on the price-cost margins but also on other components of economic structure. For instance, it might lead to a change in firms' incentives to innovate more, since a more competitive economic environment puts higher pressure on firms to survive and make profits. Thus, the question is whether the change in the competition law had impact on various innovation indicators in Dutch industries. In our further research, we plan to address this research question as well. 
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